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Exchange Rates and the European Business Cycle:
an application of a'quasi-empirical' two-country model
Dr. Pieter J.F.G. Meulendijks and
Prof. Dr. Dick B.J. Schouten (~`)
Abstract
A quasi-empirical two-country n:odel is used to analyze the present problems of a
European stagnation within an unstable European Monetary System. It integrates the q
theory of investment with the approach of a portfolio choice in which both domestic and
foreign agents spread their non-human wealth over imperfectly substltutable domestic and
foreign share capital, domestic and foreign government bonds, domestic and foreign
treasury bills, domestic and foreign time deposits and domestic andforeign money. Within
the framework of floating exchange rates, rigid labour markets, sticky price and~or
flexib[e price regimes in the goods markets, account is taken of capital accumulation,
government debt and current account dynamics. The analysis shows why politicians have
fundamental reasons to open to question the usefulness of a European Monetary Union
within a framework of fixed exchange rates. The pros of the latter system probably are
outweighed by its cons.
Keywords: Erchange rates; European business cycle; Quasi-empirical two-country mode!
I. Introduction
In this paper a quasi-empirical two-country model is used to analyze the present problems
of a European stagnation within an unstable European Monetary System (1).
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section II introduces a symmetric two-country
model. For the considerating quasi-empirical case it represents two composite countries
into which the European Community is hypothetically divided. Section III is split up into
six parts (A~F). Part A contains the formulation of the ultimate aim of this article viz. to
shed light upon the complex case of the present downswing of the European business
cycle. In Part B attention is focused on the downswing of the European business cycle
initiated by German economic policy. Starting for the present analysis from a stationary
state of the German economy, financing the costs of the German uniiication will provoke
shifting processes leading to too high nominal wage levels. The policy measures, taken by
the German budgetary and monetary authorities will cause recessive effects for Germany.
In Part C a[raditional trading partner of Germany will be introduced and is called for the
considerating quasi-empirical case 'the United Kingdom'. In this country the social
partners effectuate a normal wage level that corresponds with the developments of the
average prices, labour productivity and the terms of trade. However, the British monetary
desicion unit has made a deal with the German authorities to peg the Pound to the Mark.
The British monetary policy is not targeting output-price stabilization, as German policy
dces, but is justly aiming at stabilization of the nominal exchange rate of the Pound with
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respect to the German Mark. Within the framework of a sticky price regime in the British
goods market, it will be explained why the policy measures, initiated by Germany, will
also cause recessive effects for the United Kingdom. Thus, the latter country will become
a victim of the German policy within the framework of 'fixed' exchange rates.
Part D describes why and how a'devaluation' of the English pound, whether or not
consciously effectuated by monetary policy making, may stop the process of negative
growth. Two possibilities for effecting a devaluation of the English pound are discussed.
The first possiblity consists of expansive M1 policy measures that are taken in a delibera-
te way by the Bank of England. The second possibility consists of a successful speculative
action against the English Pound.
Part E summarizes in terms of 'causes and effects into two steps' why maintaining a
'fixed' exchange rate system can be very unfavourable for both countries under considera-
tion, and why the 'flexible' exchange rate system can be extra favourable for the same
countries which it concerns. Moreover, the policy scheme for an upturn of the European
business cycle will roughly be outlined.
Part F merely discusses ihe long-term effects of a permanent (too) high level of the labour
income share in case of rigid labour markets in Germany and in the United Kingdom.
Within the framework of flexible exchange rates it will be shown how the Central Banks
in both countries may successfully take price-stabilization policy measures. However,
both countries will remain confronted with equally negative extra rates of growth of pro-
duction and employment. Thus, the United Kingdom will not in a position to protect itself
from the negative effects of the German policy measures, in spite of a flexible exchange
rate system.
Section IV concludes the paper and stresses the benefits of a flexible exchange rate
system in case of rigid EC labour markets. Flexible exchange rates can play a very useful
role in mitigating the downward movement of real welfare in the downswing of the
European business cycle. Moreover, the analysis also suggests that the flexible exchange
rate system could play a useful role in mitigating the EC inflation rates in the event of
successful introduction of a policy-mix coordination by the EC authorities aiming a[ an
upturn of the European business cycle, in spite that the EC labour markets permanently
stay rigid.
All in all, the analysis shows why politicians have fundamental reasons to open to
question the usefulness of a European Monetary Union within a framework of fixed
exchange rates. The pros of the latter system probably are outweighed by its cons.
II. The symmetric two-country model
The basic version of the model to be applied in the following section consists of over
hundred equations and endogenous variables (Meulendijks (2)). The symmetric model at
present is significantly reduced.
Variables are formulated in deviations from a trend. This trend should not be considered
as being a random average path of the economy in the period of investigation. On the
contrary, the initial situation of the trend is law-abiding to the rules of real and monetary
growth theory. Whereas the Meulendijks' version follows the rules of a positive steady
state growth, in the present model the case of a stationary state is postulated. Using the
latter situation as a point of reference, the model at hand fits close of what is common in
international literature (3).
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Before engaging in a short discussion of some particular characteristics of the model at
hand, a few additional remarks are to be made:
The two-country model can be split up into the Country A Model and the Country B
Model .
Impulses and effects are measured in percentages as deviations from a stationary equilibri-
um; X and 'balance-variables' are measured in q-terms of equilibrium gross value-
~
added in enterprises at equilibrium market prices (GVAE);
By definition, it holds that p-y~-yb;E-EQ-Eb ; etc.
Capital letters denote nominal values, lower case letters denote volumes, prices and other
variables.
The following definitions are also important for understanding the meaning of the
variables in the model:
x- actual absolute value
zo- absolute value on stationary trend path
(X -X )
x-100 0- percentage cumulated extra rate of growth
zo
X- actual rate of growth
zo- (zero) trend rate of growth
Ox-(x-x-~) -z-zo- extra rate of growth
Appendix I contains the numerical assumptions about the ratios and elasticities for the
reference situation of the postulated stationary equilibrium. Insofar as the symbols used
are not explained in the present section, they still are interpreted in this appendix.
The Country A Model (the Country B Model is analogue to the Country A model):
(1) Gross value-added in enterprises (GVAE):
Y-YCtB~blbt~tSb
where (C), (Ib) ,(~) , and (Sb) are private consumption, gross investment, autono-
mous public sector expenditure (percentage of GVAE) and the balance on current account
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in which (tit,~) ,(t~) ,(ro) are the labour income share, the additional tax rate on wage
r"
income and the long-term real interest rate, respectively.
Consumption is determined by disposable wage and transfer income (ytiy~-ti) as well
as by consumption of non-wage income earners (CR-y-- ~o) . Apart from other social
T
benefits, disposable transfer income consists of disposable unemployment payments and
disposable civil service wages. They are received from the public sector but implicitly
paid by wage-tax revenues from the private sector. The additional wage-income-tax
rate (t~) explicitly depends on rational tax-policy measures with respect to the public
sector financial deficit; see equation (IS). As concerns the non-wage income earners, the
underlying assumption is that they spend more for consumption (CR) if national welfare
(Y) increases and less if the long-term real interest rate (r") rises.
r"
(3) Gross investment - Stock-value of share capital
As we suppose for simplicity's case ~-- a's , it follows from equations (4) and (5) that
K
In-K ` -~(Y- ~~ W ~) }a[2(E-PW)-(p-PW)] t
1}s~ (1-1`~) 1}~P
1 n n a a
1 }~p
[2(E -pW )-(Y pw )]
The latter relation integrates the q theory of investment with the approach of a portfolio
choice between imperfectly substitutable financial assets within each country as well as
across countries. The relation can be split up into two equations. Its right-hand side
implies the reduced form of the monetary sector and explains the stock-value of share
5
capital i.e. the capital-stock market value (g ~)(Meulendijks (2)). Domestic agents
implicitly spread their non-human wealth over imperfectly substitutable domestic and
foreign share capital (g ~), domestic and foreign government bonds (p) , domestic and
foreign treasury bills (Q ), domestic and foreign time deposits (Q) and domestic and-a
foreign money (~ . Foreign agents behave like domestic agents.
The reduced form has been derived from the asset demand and supply equations. Asset
demand decisions depend on the various rates of return, on the incomelnon-human wealth
ratio as well as on a certain degree of home-preference.
The left-hand side of the relation denotes the main channel of monetary transmission to
the real sector.




By definition it holds that the extra rate of growth of the stock of capital goods is
positively related to the difference between the cumulated extra rates of growth of gross
investment and the actual stock of capital goods (at the beginning of the current peri-
od-at the end of the foregoing period (k )), respectively. The actual stock of capital
goods will rise in case that actual gross investment exceeds the volume of scrapping of
technically obsolete capital goods.
(5) Tobin's q type of gross investment:
Ak- t; (K' -k-~ -Pz)
The main channel of monetary transmission to the real sector is Tobin's q i.e., in the
present model the difference between the capital-stock market value and its replacement
value is an important determinant of gross investment. There are many ways to explain
the Tobin's q transmission (Meulendijks, (2)). Besides, and the literature deals with this
circumstance (see for instance, van Els, (1)), there is as yet very little empirical knowled-
ge about the elasticity of investment (~-) with respect to Tobin's q. Probably, this is due
of a lack of information that should be given by the National Offices of Statistics. In
order to justify the use of Tobin's q in the model at present where it has a clear impact
on the analysis results, we may quote a recent Dutch study in which the empirical
actuality in the Netherlands of the q-theory of investment has been confirmed (Driehuis
and Mulder, (4)).
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(6) Balance on current account and at current prices ( percentage of GVAE):
sb--W4~YY-(2r1-1)W(Py-P,~
where (y~ ,(pW) and (py-pw) are production differences between both countries, the
nominal exchange rate and the terms of trade, respectively.
(7) Total balance of payments (percentage of GVAE)
S4-0-(2a - 1)Sb -(1-a)(K t c~)r(Y-p,~J }
(1-a)(KtW tX-x8)2a[-2(t,É-~p,~t(DY-ApNJJ
Although the latter equation draws on Meulendijks (2), in the present case the yield on
share capital (p,' ) , the real interest rate on public sector debt (p~ and the short-term
real interest rate (r ) are assumed to be equal in absolute value on the stationary trenda
path. Thus, the average rate of return (p)-(~~' -po-pQ) .
International capital movements are free, but the international capital mobility is imper-
fect. The nominal exchange rate is flexible and follows from the foreign-currency-market
equilibrium of the non-monetary sectors (Su-p) .
(8) Price change of output enterprises:
OPy-~(y-y~
in which (y~) is production capacity.
In the goods market we distinguish two alternative regimes, viz. the sticky price regi-
me (~-I) and the flexible price regime (~-oo) . In both cases output-price changes
depend on the utilization rate of production capacity. In the sticky price model, producti-
on may deviate from the level of production capacity. In the flexible price model,
production instantaneously equals production capacity.
(9) Production of enterprises equals (inefficient) employment in enterprises:
y-Y-py-1
where (n is employment. For the case of simplicity, labour productivity (y-n is
assumed to remain unchanged.
(10) Production capacity of enterprises:
y~-k -~ ~" w~
' 1-~1 n
On the supply side of the goods market, productive capacity is positively related to the
stock-volume of capital goods (at the beginning of the current period - at the end of the
foregoing period) and negatively related to real labour costs per unit of output in
enterprises (1t,~) . Imperfect substitution between the two factors of production is
postulated.
(11) Price of expenditure categories:
Px-Py- F~(Py'P,,~
The price of cornmodities is homogeneous with respect to the output price and the price
of imports (in domestic currency terms).
(12) Yield on share capital:
r-`y -Y- ~" W~-K`
r 1-Jl
By definition it holds that yield on share capital equals the difference between nominal
profits in enterprises and the capital-stock market value.
(13a) and (13b) L,ong-term real and short-term real interest rates:
To -[O-ai2(É-p~ -(Y- p„J}-2(E b-Pw~ t(Yb-Pw~l: ~P
r
T? -[Q-a{2(E-p~ -(Y-p~}-2(E b-pw~ }(Yb-Pw~~: ~P
r
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where (p~ and (Q) are the stocks of government bonds and time deposits, respective-
ly. These two equations draw on Meulendijks' portfolio subsystem (see note (2)). The
long-tenn real interest rate equals the real interest rate on public sector long-term debt
(government bonds). The short-term real interest rate equals the real interest rate on the
public sector short-term debt (treasury bills). It also equals the real interest rate on time
deposits.
(14) Public sector financial deficit including interest payments on public debt ( pereen-
tage of GVAE):
l r
-FB-c~ADtxAQ -X~-lt~-(Ktc.~)rtR-TRici(Y- " w~t~r'(O}
T)I -ít~
This relation implicitly states that short-term lending by the public sector (Q ) is by
balance for nothing.
If rational tax policy is defined as
-F8-0
the additional tax functions read




(16) The additional rate of taxes on non-wage income (percentage of disposable non-
wage income):
tR--3w~-3E
The additional wage-income tax rate positively depends on real labour costs per unit of
output in enterprises and on autonomous expenditure impulses initiated by the public
sector. The additional non-wage tax incidence is a straightforward consequence of the
endogenous wage-income-tax process in case of a change of the labour income share and
also is a result of the M1 policy by the Central Bank andlor the government (- the
public sector). In case that speculation on the foreign exchange markets is successful, the
induced money creation might have its own influence on this taxation process; see
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equation (19).
(17) Wage and salary bill per worker in enterprises:
pl-pyty-ltet~tp
Nominal wages are determined by output prices, labour productivity, shifting effects of
the burden of an additional wage taxation and an autonomous wage term, which repre-
sents the influence of wage policy as agreed, whether or not in a conscious way, by the
labour market parties. Apart from the latter three determinants, this equation implicitly
states that the price of expenditure categories and the terms of trade are absorbed in the
nominal wage formation. Effects of labour market tensions on wage formation are
assumed to be absent because of the prevailing high European unemployment levels in
recent years. Thus, the present analysis deals with labour market rigidity at home and
abroad.
(18) Labour income share equals real labour costs per worker in enterprises:
w~-p~-py-ytl-wy
This is because labour productivity does not change; see equation (9).






E-8~}Q t Speculative profits -1E,} 1ET1Est 1Y
2 2 2 2
where (~ and (Q) are the Central Bank M1 policy and the public sector short-term
lending policy, respectively. Transaction money equals gross value-added in enterprises.
Thus, the velocity of circulation of transaction money remains constant.
lo
(20) (M2-M1) stock of money consists of time deposits (Q):
Q-Qt Speculative profits
Note that time deposits (Q) are influenced by the total short-term lending to the public
sector (Q) and by the speculative profits, but not by the Central Bank M1
policy (B~ .
III. How exchange rates can play an important role in the downswing and the
upturn of the European business cycle
Part A: Formutation of the problem
In an earlier study on the European integration process from EC to EMU a centralization
of EC policymaking was recommended (2). A fully autonomous national policymaking
should be forbidden. However, there are practical as well as theoretical reasons why
unilateraly, but cooperatively, taken 'compensatory price, wage, budgetary or monetary
policy-measures' are unavoidable.
What may happen if this recommendation is not taken seriously by the different national
decision authorities can be demonstrated by analyzing the present problems of a European
stagnation within an unstable European Monetary System. Last year this instability came
to the surface: the European foreign currency market was in severe turmoil. Germany and
the United Kingdom played a leading role in this economic-political drama. Speculative
agents were given a great deal of room on the exchange markets and, as usual, politicians
and bankers viewed this situation as an immoral one. One of the questions to be discussed
concerns the appropriateness of this point of view.
In the following parts of this section the complex case of the present downswing of the
European business cycle will be analyzed as well in which two large open countries, for
instance, Germany and the iJnited Kingdom, have probably played a dominant part.
Using the symmetric two-country model in section II, results will be derived which
correspond strikingly with the poor economic performance Western Europe is confronted
with nowadays. Theoretically speaking, the EC decision units concerned can be offered a
solution in order to create the necessary upturn of the European business cycle in the near
future. At least politicians can learn from what the reversed signs of the negative results
to be presented later have to tell (see Tables Ia and Ib).
Part B: The downswing of the European business cycle initiated by German
economic policy
The attention is focused on a(large) open country and for the considerating quasi-
empirical case this composite country is called 'Germany'. As is usual in capitalistic
countries, in this economy the wage, budgetary and monetary policy measures are left
uncoordinated. Any of the three important decision units has its proper responsibility. The
two Unions of the labour market decide on the levels of (collectively agreed) nominal
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wage contracts. The government consequently decides on the tax rate levels aiming at a
desired level of expenditures by the public sector and the desired financial deficit. Finally,
the 'German Bundesbank' takes monetary policy measures aiming at stable productíon
prices.
Starting for the present analysis from a stationary state of the German economy, nominal
wages are increased in consequence of the German unification that has been suddenly
realised recently. A nominal wage increase in Gerinany while the price of production and
labour productivity are maintained at a constant level implies an increase of the real
labour costs per unit of output in enterprises. Thus, Germany is confronted with an
autonomously induced wage impulse. It will affect the production capacity of enterprises
negatively (5). If production were also lowered (or perhaps maintained at a constant
level), but initíally at a lower speed as production capacity is decreasing, prices would
tend to rise. However, an actual rise of prices is prevented by contractive monetary
policy measures. Nevertheless, the M1 contraction in order to maintain price stability will
cause higher interest rates. Moreover, the profitability of enterprises will be lowered by
an increase of the real labour costs per unit of output and will affect the level of invest-
ment.
At unchanged tax rates, this policy would imply a higher financial deficit of the German
government because non-wage tax revenues will become lower whereas interest payments
on public debt will increase. Higher non-wage tax rates are irrational because they also
affect the profitability of enterprises. Therefore a rational tax policy is likely to imply
lower non-wage tax rates if the labour income share of enterprises increases.
Because the German government is aiming at a constant financial deficit of the public
sector, raising the rate of taxes on wage income is the only rational way to realize this.
The possibility of lowering the necessary governmental expenditures, needed for the
German unification, is excluded. Thus, the extra burden of taxation on wages will imply
that the disposable wage income is not increasing, in spite of the initial rise of the
nominal wage leveL All in all, the level of consumption from wage income will hardly be
affected because of the lower prices of imports inducing a lower price of expenditure
categories. Higher interest rates and the lower profitability of enterprises surely affect the
level of consumption from non-wage income. However, its relatively small importance
for the total level of private consumption will imply that private consumption is hardly
affected in a downward direction.
Only two expenditure categories remain for matching demand and supply in the goods
market, viz. gross investment and the balance on current account (at constant prices).
Higher interest rates on commercial loans and a lower profitability of enterprises will
lower the level of investment. The balance on current account will be affected too in a
downward direction because of a deterioration of the German competitive force, and of
course because the rate of decrease of the German level of domestic expenditures falls
short with the rate of decrease of production capacity. At current prices, however, the
balance on current account is not affected. A lower balance on current account at constant
prices is fully compensated by the ameliorated terms of trade.
Unemployment in Germany will increase to a significantly higher level and will continu-
ously rise in consequence of a too low level of investment.
A low level of domestic investment also affects the German balance on capital account in
a downward direction. But, the reverse development can be recognized with respect to the
balance on capital income account.
The total balance of payments (of the non-monetary sectors) will be in equilibrium of
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course in the event of flexible exchange rates.
Part C: The United Kingdom as a victim of the German policy within the
framework of 'fixed' exchange rates
A traditional trading partner of Germany has been introduced and for the considerating
quasi-empirical case this composite country is called 'the United Kingdom'. It represents
all other countries in Western Europe in so far they were or still are confronted with
exchange rate difficulties. In this composite country the social partners effectuate a
normal wage level that corresponds with the developments of the average prices, labour
productivity and the terms of trade. Besides, the 'British' monetary desicion unit has
made a deal with the German authorities to peg the Pound to the Mark by using monetary
policy measures. Actually, this is because the United Kingdom initially is a member of
the EMS in which the DM plays a role of an anchor currency. Consequently the Bank of
England has to adopt a monetary policy which matches the constant ratio requirement of
its currency with respect to the Mark. Thus, the British monetary policy is not targeting
output-price stabilization, as German policy does, but is justly aiming at stabilization of
the nominal exchange rate of the Pound with respect to the German Mark (6). The same
authority tries to stabilize its financial deficit, in spite of the higher burden of interest
payments on government debt, using non-wage-tax policy measures. The latter policy
actions are also taken in Germany. But in this country, wage-tax policy measures are
preferred because the non-wage income share has already been decreased.
Two possibilities can now be discussed:
The first case deals with the sticky price regime in the goods market of the United
Kingdom and the second case is referred to as a dominant flexible price regime in this
country. The first possibility implies that the degree of utilization of profitable production
capacity may be lower than ]00 qo; this is because prices are not flexible enough. Using
the flexible price case, prices are flexible and even they are instantaneously flexible in the
present paper.
It is easy to understand why the sticky price case is to be preferred to the flexible price
regime in the case of a threatening underutilization of production capacity. A lower actual
level of production than production capacity would allow is always possible. However, in
the second case of a threatening overutilization of production capacity, the postulate of the
flexible price regime is to be preferred because a higher level of production than
'profitable' production capacity allows is useless.
The policy measures, initiated by Germany, cause recessive effects for the United
Kingdom since it maintains exchange rate tability with respect to the DM. So, it is
obvious that the latter country is dealing with~e sticky price regime.
The distinction between sticky price vs flexible price regimes is not important from the
German policy makers' point of view because their monetary policy measures are aimed
at stabilization of the domestic prices of production. Together with a lack of wage costs
determinants in the price formation equation, it implies that the domestic results of the
German policy measures are the same for both alternatives of price formation in the
goods market.
The recessive effects in the United Kingdom can be explained in more detail as follows.
The necessary English contractive monetary policy implies a significant slow-down of
production as a result of the postulated sticky price model. The low value of 1 for the
elasticity of the output price with respect to the utilization rate of production capacity
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implies, moreover, decreasing nominal wages and prices. In percentage terms, their
decreases eyual the decrease of production. The latter percentage amounts to half of the
M1 contraction qo effectuated by the English monetary authorities aiming at exchange rate
stabilization of the Englïsh pound.
The English competitive position improves and the imports from Germany decrease as a
result of the slow-down of production. A positive balance on current account (at constant
prices) will finally be realised, in spite of decreasing exports to Germany. However the
balance on current account at current prices will be unchanged in consequence of the
deterioration of the English terms of trade.
The comhination of a significant slow-down of total demand and production in the goods
market and a positive English trade balance implies that two expenditure categories are
seriously affected by the English contractive monetary policy, viz., those of private
consumption and private investment. This is not only due to the higher interest rates. The
seriously decreased purchasing power in the English domestic goods market can be
considered as an even more important reason. The latter deterioration has been caused by
an insufficient decrease of the price of expenditure categories compared with the
significant decreases of the English nominal wages and non-wages.
The foregoing analysis indicates why the United Kingdom has explicitly become a victim
of its own political conduct by keeping itself to the promise of maintaining the exchange
rate of the English pound constant with respect to the Deutsch Mark. This is especially
true if Germany, as an anchor country, takes contractive monetary policy measures
exclusively aimed at its national policy targets.
Table Ia: The downswing of the business cycle
(period 1; impulses and effects are extra rates of growth measured in percentages)
In Germany: Wage impulse, tax increase and M1 contraction
In the United Kingdom: a) M1 contraction aiming at exchange rate stabili-
zation of the english Pound
b) and subsequently depreciation of the English
Pound by using money creation
VariableslCountries Germany United Kingdom
(Sticky-Price Mo-
del)
Instrumental variables or Impul- a) b) a) b)
ses in q in qo in q in q
la: Nominal wage impulse 5~7 0 0 0
lb: Autonomous expenditure impul-
se of the public sector (in per- 0 0 0 0
centage points of GVAE)
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2: Rate of taxes on wage income
in q of private sector primary 0.5 0 0 0
wage income
3: Rate of taxes on non-wage
income in qo of disposable non- -0.8 0 1.613 -1.613
wage income
4: Money creation of the Central
Bank -0.8 0 -0.8 (0.8)~
5: Money creation by speculation 0 0 0 0.8
Target variables or Effects a) b) a) b)
inqo in~o inqo inq
1: Production and employment in -0.8 0 -0.4 0.4
enterprises
2: Price of output enterprises - 0 0 -0.4 0.4
price of exports
3: Nominal exchange rate 0 -0.8 0 0.8
4: Volume of private consumption -2.319 0.1 -4.5~9 0.3
5: Public sector financial deficit
including interest payments on 0 0 0 0
public debt in qo of GVAE
Remaining Variables a) b) a) b)
in~ inqo inqo inqo
6: Wage and salary bill per worker 1.0 0 -0.4 0.4
in enterprises
7: Real labour costs per unit of
output in enterprises - labour 1.0 0 0 0
income share in terms of GVAE
8: Real disposable wage and salary -0.2 0.1 -0.5 0.3
bill per worker ïn enterprises
9: Price of imports in terms of -0.4 -0.4 0 0.8
domestic currency
10: Price of expenditure categories -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.5
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11: Terms of trade in qo of GVAE 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1
12: Volume of exports of goods and -0.8 0 -0.4 0.4
services
13: Volume of imports of goods -0.4 0.4 -0.8 0
and services
14: Balance on current account at
constant prices in qo of GVAE -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1
15: Balance on current account at
current prices in qo of GVAE 0 0 0 0
16: Volume of gross investment -4.7 0.1 -0.5 0.3
17: Stock of capital goods 0.235 0.005 -0.025 0.015
(volume at the end of the period)
18: Production capacity of enterpri- -0.8 0 0
0
ses
19: Nominal value of GVAE -0.8 0 -0.8 0.8
20: Nominal market value of the -4.8 0 -0.8 0.8
stock of share capital
21: Nominal market value of long- 0 0 0
0
tetm public debt
22: Nominal value of time deposits 0 0 0 0.8
(0) ~`
23: Real interest rate on long-term 0.8 0 0.8 -0.8
public sector debt
24: Yield on share capital -4.0 0 0 0
25: Real interest rate on time depo- 0.8 0 0.8
0
sits and commercial bank loans (-0.8)~
26: Private sector disposable nomi- -0.52 0 -0.92
0.72
nal income
27: Private sector savings in qo of
GVAE -0.2 0 -0.2 0
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28: Nett investment in ol~ of GVAE - 0.4 0 0 0
29: Balance on capital account on
account of share capital in q of 0 0.2 0
GVAE
30: Balance on capital account on
account of public sector bonds 0 0 0 0
in q of GVAE
31: Remaining balances on capital
account in q of GVAE 0 0 0 0
32: Balance on capital income
account on account of share 0.2 0 -0.2 0
capital yields and real interest
revenues of public sector bonds
33: Total balance of payments of
the non-banking sector 0 0 0 0
34: Utilization rate of production 0 0 -0.4 0.4
capacity of enterprises
35: Balance Sheet Control: the
financial components of the 0 0 0 0
definitial relationship between
the Banks, the Central Bank,
the Public Sector and the Priva-
te Sector sum up to zero.
~` Effects denoted between brackets concern qo-changes in consequence of a delibera-
te expansive M1 policy
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Table Ib: The long-term effects of a too high level of the labour income share, a
rigid labour market and a price-stabilization policy in both countries
(Results concern extra rates of growth ~)
Country: Germany United Kingdom
Definition
Period: 1 ~` 1 ~
Cases: a)f b) a) f b) a) f b) a) f b)
Variables in q in qo in q in q
Impulses in q in q in qo in qo
Nominal wage impulse Sl7 0 0 0
Money creation by Central -0.8 -0.12 0 -0.12
Banks
Effects in q in q in q in q
Production and employment -0.8 -0.12 0 -0.12
in enterprises
Price of output enterprises 0 0 0 0
Nominal exchange rate -0.8 0 0.8 0
(-9.6)~` (9.6)~`
Stock of capital goods -0.23 -0.12 -0.01 -0.12
(volume at the end of the
period)
Labour income share 1.0 0 0 0
(1. 0) ~` (0) ~`
Terms of trade in qo of 0.4 0 -0.4 0
GVAE (4.8)~` (-4.8)
~
~` The results denoted between brackets concern the cumulated extra rates of growth
and explain the ultimate level as a deviation from initial trend value of the
corresponding variable.
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Part D: A'devaluation' of the English pound, whether or not consciously
effectuated by monetary policy making
Although the domestic prices of expenditure categories will decrease in both countries (in
Germany because of lower prices of imports and in the United Kindom because of lower
output prices) the public demand for a devaluation of the English pound will become
louder. The resulting change in the exchange rate may stop the process of negatíve
growth and it will surely be a realistic alternative since the United Kingdom is confronted
with the sticky-price regime in the goods market. There are two possibilities for effecting
a devaluation of the English pound with respect to the Deutsch Mark.
The first possibility consists of expansive M1 policy measures that are taken in a
conscious way by the Bank of England. (Note that these policy measures are taken after
the period during which the Bank of England has pursued a contractive M1 policy aiming
at exchange rate stabilization of the English pound.)
However, in order to realise this possibility, the British authorities must first convince the
German authorities of its profitability for both countries. As stated, it is easy to under-
stand why it may be profitable if the sticky-price regime dominates the English goods
market. Under such circumstances, the devaluation of the English pound will cause higher
levels of production in the United Kindom. They are profitable too for the private
expenditure categories in Germany because they are partially transmitted by an ameliora-
tion of the German terms of trade. However, it also means that German competitive
power is worsened again. German exports will initially decline, but afterwards they will
return to their initial level since higher English production levels will induce higher
English imports equaling higher German exports.
Without explicitly mentioning them, there are many reasons why the English authorities
will wait to ask the necessary permission of the German authorities for actually carrying
out such a profitable devaluation. If speculative agents consider this too long [hey will
aim at speculative profits and may successfully realise them if the Bank of England's
foreign reserves fall short of the speculative agents' demand for the Deutsch Mark. This
second possibility of the Pound's devaluation has been made possible by the Bundesbank
authorities. Their lack of sufficient financial help to the Bank of England may be the only
reason why the British foreign currency reserves could be exhausted by speculation.
Thus, speculation can be a proper source of money creation without extra M1 policy
measures taken by the Central Banking Authorities or without an extra short-term lending
policy by the governmental authorities.
The equaling percentage rates with regard to the aforementioned 'speculative' devaluation
and money creation are essentially unknown. For convenience's sake, we shall fix them
on the same level we could derive for the depreciation-q of the English pound in the
event of a deliberate British policy of non-monetary-intervention as a response to the
German policy action described in Table Ia, but without 'an earlier promise' to peg the
Pound to the Deutsch Mark (and of course, without speculative intervention). The results
in the latter situation equal those which can be derived by adding up the 'two-step' results
of our actual case as denoted in the a) and b) columns of Table Ia.
It is noteworthy that both possibilities of the Pound's devalution and the subsequent
money creation in the United Kingdom ultimately do not affect the quantity of money in
Germany. Thus, the usual Bundesbank's 'inflation' arguments for refusing the necessary
credit facilities to the Bank of England do not hold.
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All in all, under exceptional circumstances, speculative actions are morally allowed. This
conclusion certainly holds if the monetary authorities concerned wait too long to act in
order to change the exchange rate. If a fixed exchange rate causes a heavy stagnation, a
flexible change of this rate can be a useful solution for all partners. It is because of the
Central Banks' weakness if they have to take their losses in case a devaluation occurs due
to the speculative agents on the foreign exchange market.
Part E: The policy scheme for an upturn of the European business cycle
After discussion of the causes of the downswing of the European business cycle, the
reversed signs of the results shown in Table Ia may roughly outline the necesary policy
measures to be taken for an upturn of the European business cycle.
The effects of various impulses on endogenous variables in period 1, as are shown in
Table Ia, underline our remarks for the first period with regard to the present downswing
of the European business cycle. Not only are the percentage values of the variables
important, but also their signs. Our qualitative way of arguing depends on these signs.
They may be positive, negative or zero.
All in all, we have already concluded that a fixing of nominal exchange rates will be
unprofitable for the United Kingdom as well as for Germany; See the two a)-coltunns of
Table Ia. What will happen if the English monetary authorities still decide to change their
earlier course and consciously effect a devaluation of the English pound has been shown
in the two b)-columns of Table Ia. Moreover, the latter results roughly indicate why
under specific circumstances a successful devaluation by speculative operations on the
foreign exchange market can also be profitable for both countries.
In the United Kingdom the interest rates will be lowered and the underutilization of
production capacity will diminish. The English rate of unemployment can be lowered too.
In Germany the level of production will be maintained, but the devaluation of the English
currency appears to be profitable for the German consumers because of the ameliorating
terms of trade. In spite of a worsening competitive power, the German level of exports
can be maintained since the higher English level of production will induce higher imports
from Germany. The German imports from the United Kingdom will also increase because
they have become cheaper in terms of the Deutsch Mark.
Nevertheless, a devaluation only appears to be a partial solution for the European
troubles, as we can actually observe nowadays.
Reversing the signs of the Table Ia-figures will provide a policy scheme that probably is
useful for an integral European solution. It rough(y suggests the dire necessity of a strong
coordination of price, wage, budgetary and monetary policy by the EC authorities. In
particular, the combination of moderated nominal wages, lower tax rates, unchanged
financial deficits of the EC governments and expansive monetary policy measures by the
EC Central Banks seems to be the only realistic policy-mix in order to initiate the
necessary upturn in at least Western Europe.
Part F: The long-term effects in the event of a rigid labour market
The long-term results of the analysis, as shown in Table Ib, indicate what will happen in
Germany and the United Kingdom if both labour markets permanently remain rigid. In
addition, from a qualitative point of view the same figures also indicate the fate which
other EC countries will have to share with them.
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Rigid labour markets imply sustained excessive labour income shares from the beginning
period in which these excessive shares are effected. In spite of the continuously rising
unemployment rates, they will remain unchanged.
In the example a flexible exchange rate system is postulated which allows the two Central
Banks to stabilize their domestic prices of production, regardless to the consequences for
the nominal exchange rate of their domestic currencies.
In the latter case and as a consequence of a continuously decreasing capacity of producti-
on, the monetary policy has to be a permanently contractive one. The initial highly
negative rate of growth of the German production capacity will gradually be lowered,
whereas the reverse development takes place in the United Kingdom. Ultimately, in the
very long term of course, both countries will be confronted with the same negative rate of
growth of their capacity of production.
In our example, German positive wage impulses have initiated this overall process of
stagnation. The United Kingdom will not be able to protect itself against this latter
development, in spite of its rational wage policy within the framework of flexible
exchange rates.
In the long term the nominal exchange rates will stabilize and imply an ultimate deprecia-
tion of the English pound, whereas the Deutsch Mark ultimately appreciates.
Between the initial and the ultimate period of analysis, the process of adaptation is
showing a continuously depreciating English pound at a rate which corresponds with a
lower English speed of monetary contraction compared with that of the Germans. This
process of adaptation can be understood by pointing out again that the English negative
rate of growth of production falls short (in the short and the medium term) of the
corresponding negative rate in Getmany.
All in all, the consequences of the aforementioned events ultimately imply definitively
deteriorated terms of trade for the United Kingdom and, of course, the reverse si[uation is
true for Germany. Because these terms of trade will compensate the balances on current
account at constant prices for both countries, the corresponding balances on current
account at current prices will always remain constant.
Finally, the foregoing analysis should make it clear that the EC countries will be
confronted with very poor prospects for the future if the European markets andlor
coordinating EC authorities fail to operate in the way we suggested in the present paper.
IV. Concluding remarks
The central issue in this paper concerns the influence of exchange rates on the European
busines cycle. Using a'quasi-empirical' two-country model, results have been derived
which correspond strikingly with the poor economic performance Western Europe is
confronted nowadays. The analysis started by elucidating why the European foreign
currency market was in severe turmoil last year and still is in present days but, perhaps,
also will stay in the future within the framework of an unstable European Monetary
System. Financing the costs of the German (re)unification provoked too high nominal
wage levels. In order to protect price and governmental-financial-deficit stability, German
tax-increase and M1-contraction policy measures had been taken. This combination of an
autonomously induced positive wage impulse and the conuiously taken tax-increase and
MI-contraction policy measures set the recessive movement of the German economy in
motion. The analysis also showed how the downswing of the European business cycle had
been initiated by this German policy. Consequently the Bank of England had to adopt
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monetary policy measures that matched the constant-ratio requirement of its currency with
respect to the German currency and actually implied that the United Kingdom had to
follow the German contractive monetary policy. In case of the postulated sticky-price
regime in the British goods market, the United Kingdom was also confronted with
stagnation and became a victim of its own political conduct by keeping itself to the
promise of maintaining the exchange rate of the English pound constant with respect to
the Deutsch Mark.
The analysis firstly suggested a partial solution for the European troubles by consciously
effecting a devaluation of the English pound or, under specific circumstances, by a
successful devaluation caused by speculative operations against the English currency.
However, an integral solution, aiming at an upturn of the European business cycle, will
consist of a strong coordination of moderated nominal wages, lower tax rates, unchanged
financial deficits of the EC governments and expansive monetary policy measures by the
EC authorities. If this coordination remains undone andlor the European markets, in
particular the labour markets, fail to operate the EC countries will be confronted with
very poor economic perfotmances in the future.
Finally, the analysis showed the benefíts of flexible exchange rates in case of rigid EC
labour markets. They could play a very useful role in mitigating the downward movement
of real welfare in the downswing of the European business cycle. Moreover, the analysis
roughly suggested that the flexible exchange rate system could play a useful role in
mitigating the EC inflation rates in case of an upturn of the European business cycle. The
latter conclusions remain true in the event that EC labourmarkets would permanently stay
rigid.
All in all, the analysis showed why politicians actually have fundamental reasons to open
to question the usefulness of a European Monetary Union within a framework of fixed
exchange rates. The pros of the latter system probably are outweighed by its cons.
Notes:
(~`) The authors are ass. professor and emeritus professor of economics, respectively, with
the Department of Economics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg,
The Netherlands.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Symposium on
Ec.onomic Modelling, University of Piraeus, Athens, Greece, 2-4 June 1993.
(1) At different Economic Modelling Conferences attention was paid to "Econometric
versus quasi-empirical modelling" for policy analysis; see for instance van Els, P.J.A.,
Econometric versus quasiempirical models; Macroeconomic policy analysis in the Nether-
lands, Economic Modelling, Vol 7, no 2, April 1990, pp 133-147.
(2) Meulendijks, Pieter J.F.G,"De betekenis van reële en financiële internationalisa-
tiegraden voor volkshuishoudingen" (On the significance of varying degrees of internatio-
nal economic and financial integration for economies), Wolters-Noordhoff bv Groningen,
ISBN 90 O1 58290 7, 1992.
(3) The (inter)national accounting identities (Balance sheets) of the inital situation,
including the non-monetary sector as well as the tïnancial relationships between the
banks, the Central Bank, the Government, and the private non-banking sector are stated
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for both countries in our article: "De monetaire inflatietheorie versus de reële stagflatie-
theorie"(Monetary inflation theory vs real stagflation theory), Maandschrift Economie,
Wolters-Noordhoff, Groningen, Jaargang 56, 1992, No 5. By aggregating the two-country
model in section II, the closed model of "the European economy" can be derived together
with the numerical values of its accounting identities.
(4) Driehuis, Wim, and Mulder, Rob J.,De q-theorie van het investeringsgedrag (The q
theory of investment), forthcoming in Maandschrift Economie, Wolters Noordhoff,
Groningen.
(5) The same kind of consequences, and likely being more realistic ones, could be
obtained if it was postulated that the German unification implied extra governmental
expenditures to he covered hy extra wagc taxes. These wage-tax-rate increases would set
the shifting-process machine in motiun which ultimately would be harmful for the profits
of German enterprises. The latter possibility will not be considered explicitly in the
present article. Nevertheless, financing the costs of the German unification provoked
shifting processes leading to too high nominal wage levels.
(6) Note that in an open economy the two monetary targets of price stabilization and
nominal exchange rate stabilization can never be reached in a simultaneous way.
Appendix I: Ratios and elasticities of the stationary equilibrium state
(1) Ratio of private consumption to GVAE y -0 9.
(2) Ratio of gross investment to GVAE 1á -0~ .
6
(3) Labour income share (Ratio to NVAE) 8
1l -n 9
(4) Labour income share (Ratio to GVAE)
~l -0.8
(5) Substitution elasticity with respect to speculative money ~p-1
(6) Ratio of imports or exports to GVAE 25~ -0.
(7) Expenditure elasticity of imports pX-1
(8) Substitution elasticity foreign produced goods with Q-1
respectto home produced goods
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(9) Competitive price elasticity belonging to equation (7)
~rl -a(1-~)-0.75
(10) Output elasticity of imports
Wx -2
~y- 1-2~px
(11) Competitive price elasticity belonging to equation (10)
~ -1.5
~- 1-2p~x
Note! If we postulate 2~ -1-pv
it is true that Sb-~.(-2YtpxJ
If we also postulate 1W-
the reduced form of a few fundamental
equations can be expressed in a very
simple way, for instance:
Actual stock-value of share capital: K' -E-4w ~
Yield on actual stock-value of share .
capital: r' --4w ~
T
Real interest rate on public sector




(12) Accelerator ~ -0.05
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(13) Shares of domestic and foreign holdings of financial
assets in total domestic financial assets, respectively a-0.5
(1-a) -0.5
(14) Capital output ratio
K -2
(15) Ratio of total long-term lending to the public sector to
GVAE ~-1
(16) Ratio M1 to GVAE 1
x-3
(17) Ratio of scrapping of technically obselete capital goods
to GVAE x8 -0.1
(18) Elasticity of the output price with respect to the utilizati-
on rate of production capacity ~-1'~`
(19) Yield on share capital and real interest rate on public
sector debt, after tax r-
(1-iR)r""-
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(20) Rate of taxes on non-wage income 1
~R--
3
(21) Yield on share capital and real ínterest rate on public 'sector debt r -0.05
(22) Ratio of taxes on non-wage income to GVAE 1
'T 1C7' --
R 30




(24) Effect of the burden of taxation on wage formation
4E--
Í
(25) Elasticity of production capacity with respect to real
labour costs
~
~ „ -~ g
1 -hR
(26) Ratio of disposable non-wage income to GVAE - Ratio
"of consumption of non-wage income earners to GVAE A)T-O.1(1Ct(
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